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Apparent sunk cost effect in rational agents
Torben Ott1,2*†, Paul Masset3*†, Thiago S. Gouvêa4, Adam Kepecs2*
Rational decision makers aim to maximize their gains, but humans and other animals often fail to do so, exhibiting
biases and distortions in their choice behavior. In a recent study of economic decisions, humans, mice, and rats
were reported to succumb to the sunk cost fallacy, making decisions based on irrecoverable past investments to
the detriment of expected future returns. We challenge this interpretation because it is subject to a statistical fallacy,
a form of attrition bias, and the observed behavior can be explained without invoking a sunk cost–dependent
mechanism. Using a computational model, we illustrate how a rational decision maker with a reward-maximizing
decision strategy reproduces the reported behavioral pattern and propose an improved task design to dissociate
sunk costs from fluctuations in decision valuation. Similar statistical confounds may be common in analyses of cognitive behaviors, highlighting the need to use causal statistical inference and generative models for interpretation.
INTRODUCTION
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Here, we show that the relationship between time invested and
the probability of earning a reward is subject to a statistical fallacy
and arises in elementary decision models without invoking sunk
costs. Therefore, the proposed behavioral signature cannot be used
to infer sunk cost sensitivity. First, we provide an intuitive example
of investment behavior without sunk costs to illustrate how apparent
sunk cost sensitivity can arise as a consequence of a form of attrition
bias, a type of selection bias that is well known in randomized controlled trials (11, 12). Next, we present a toy decision model that
accounts for the choice behavior and that reproduces the reported
behavioral signatures without sunk costs. Then, we provide a formal analysis of the economic decision task used by Sweis et al. (8) to
consider the general conditions under which apparent sunk cost
sensitivity can emerge. In light of our model, we also consider
several additional findings presented by Sweis et al. (8), such as the
absence of the apparent sunk cost sensitivity during offer deliberation, concluding that they do not lend further support to sunk cost
sensitivity. Last, we propose extensions to their foraging task to
isolate the potential influence of sunk costs on decision behavior.
Our analysis implies that direct evidence for sunk cost sensitivity in
animals is still lacking, highlighting the necessity of using causal
inference and generative models to interpret complex behavioral
patterns.
RESULTS

A rational decision maker with apparent sunk
cost–sensitive behavior
Imagine a perfectly rational economist getting coffee on her way to
work. One morning, her favorite coffee shop has a particularly long
line. Should she still get a coffee and accept the longer wait or go
next door where the line is usually shorter but where the coffee is
worse? This is an investment problem in which our rational
decision maker must decide whether a large investment—long
waiting time in line—is worth the expected return—an excellent
cup of coffee (Fig. 1A).
Let us first consider the coffee line across different days. On
Monday morning, our economist is highly motivated to drink her
favorite coffee—maybe there is a lengthy meeting ahead—so she
joins the long line. However, on another day, she might have decided
to skip this long line. Then, once in the line, she keeps deliberating:
Is the line moving fast enough? Or did the morning meeting time
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We all strive to make good decisions that provide the maximum
benefit for the lowest cost. However, we often succumb to a variety
of cognitive biases, that is, systematic deviations from rational decisions that lead to suboptimal returns (1–3). Understanding the
behavioral and neural processes that are responsible for cognitive
biases could uncover the fundamental principles behind decision-
making. Nonhuman animals also face decisions where the best
course of action requires considering uncertainty, time, and costs.
Thus, comparative studies across species can reveal insights into the
biological origins of choice biases and shed light on the roots of
irrational behavior (4).
The sunk cost fallacy is a prominent cognitive bias, valuing an
option more highly because of the resources already invested in it,
instead of just considering expected future returns (5). In other
words, people often stick with their poor decisions if they have
already invested time, effort, or money in these decisions, even if the
rational, that is, return-maximizing, behavior would be to abandon
the investment and seek new opportunities. This sensitivity to sunk
costs is suboptimal, thus challenging normative accounts of human
decision-making (1, 6). However, it has been debated whether there
is sufficient behavioral evidence for sunk cost–sensitive decisions in
animals or, rather, if it is a uniquely human behavior (6, 7). Recently,
Sweis et al. (8) argued that humans, mice, and rats are sensitive to
sunk costs. In their tasks, the subjects had to make a sequence of
decisions about how to allocate a limited time budget to gain rewards of different qualities [“web surf” task in humans (9) and
“restaurant row” in rats and mice (10)]. Do subjects invest more
time in a decision after they have already invested a lot of time?
Their answer was yes: All three species seem to succumb to the sunk
cost fallacy. They observed a universal behavioral pattern, one
argued to be a signature of sunk cost sensitivity: The more time
subjects had invested toward gaining a reward, the more likely the
subjects were to keep investing until reward delivery, even when the
expected future reward was the same.
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Fig. 1. The coffee line dilemma: Attrition bias produces an apparent sunk cost fallacy. (A) A rational decision maker deliberates whether to invest time waiting in line
to get her favorite coffee. (B) On different days, the decision maker’s initial motivation to wait in line may be different. Her motivation while waiting in line fluctuates over
time (each line corresponds to one decision to wait) due to many factors such as new information, variations in attention, or even randomly. (C) When following the initial
decisions to wait across time [the two examples in (B) are shown as dashed lines], the decision maker will receive a coffee in some instances (brown dots), while in other
instances she will eventually quit (red dots). However, analyzing longer waiting times (greater sunk costs) will bias the remaining observations toward higher initial
motivation levels and therefore a higher likelihood of receiving a coffee. This observation bias, a form of attrition bias, leads to apparent sunk cost–sensitive behavior in
rational agents.

Ott et al., Sci. Adv. 8, eabi7004 (2022)
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already spent waiting (i.e., sunk costs) and the likelihood of getting
a coffee as evidence that sunk costs directly influence the investment
decision to wait in line.
Any potential sources of variation that influence momentary
motivation, from stress to attentional lapses to random fluctuations, would produce similar correlations between the waiting time
and likelihood of getting the cup of coffee. Even changes across
days, such as increased initial motivation to enter a line for coffee as
the week progresses, will lead to apparent sunk cost–sensitive
behavioral patterns even in a rational decision maker who does not
consider sunk costs.
In the following section, we describe a generic decision model
with a rational decision maker facing the same investment decisions
as in our coffee line example, here matched to the economic task
and parameters used by Sweis et al. (8). This agent’s investment
decisions are not influenced by sunk costs. However, the agent’s
investment behavior shows the apparent behavioral signatures of
sunk costs.
A simple decision model produces apparent sensitivity
to sunk costs without any sunk cost mechanism
First, we briefly review the behavioral design and argument for sunk
costs in the study of Sweis et al. (8). Humans, rats, and mice were
tested on how to allocate a limited time budget to gain rewards. The
subjects had to first decide whether to accept or reject a time investment offer, which was the time investment required to wait for a
fixed, guaranteed reward. After accepting an offer, the subjects
could decide at any moment to forgo the time already invested by
aborting the trial and seeking a potentially less costly (shorter-time
investment) reward in the next trial. Across trials, the experimenters
offered different time investment durations, enabling them to
compare the probability of aborting a trial for the same remaining
investment time with different values of the time already invested.
The authors showed that the more time the subjects had invested
toward a reward, the more likely the subjects were to keep investing
until reward delivery; that is, the slope of the conditional probability
of staying as a function of time to reward delivery decreases with the
2 of 10
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change at work? The motivation to keep waiting in line can fluctuate for different reasons—either because of new information or
even randomly—and a substantial drop will prompt our economist
to quit the line and move on (Fig. 1B). Without any variability in
her motivation to wait, the economist would never leave the line—
which is inconsistent with both our everyday experience and the
behavioral patterns observed by Sweis and colleagues.
That Monday, our economist experiences a drop in motivation
to wait for her coffee and decides to leave the line. Shifts in motivation will influence a rational agent, who chooses the most valuable
action given the current circumstances. Despite leaving the line, our
economist is a rational agent. On Tuesday morning, the line is
equally long but she is even more motivated to get her favorite
coffee—maybe she did not get enough sleep (Fig. 1B). Let us
suppose that she experiences identical fluctuations in motivation as
the previous day, yet she stays in line until the barista finally hands
her a delicious double espresso. Why did she wait so long? Did she
succumb to the sunk cost fallacy?
To answer this question, we might be tempted to check whether
different amounts of time spent waiting (i.e., sunk costs) predicted
how often our rational economist ended up getting a coffee, and to
use that as a signature for sunk cost–sensitive behavior. However,
the resulting behavioral pattern—longer wait times predicting a
higher likelihood of receiving espresso, even when the duration of
the remaining in line is the same—is confounded by varying levels
of motivation. Motivation is unlikely to remain constant across
days or while waiting, and even random fluctuations can trigger the
decision to stop waiting. Consequently, if we examine longer waits,
those will be biased toward days when her initial motivation to wait
was higher to begin with (Fig. 1C). In randomized controlled trials,
this selection bias is known as “attrition bias”; here, a differential
dropout rate of study participants (days, in our example) can introduce apparent treatment success (getting coffee, in our example)
because of the “attrition” of study participants (11, 12). This statistical fallacy impedes causal inference of the factors that might influence the likelihood of getting a cup of coffee, such as sunk costs.
Therefore, we cannot interpret the correlation between the time
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duration of time already invested [figure 2 in (8)]. This behavioral
pattern is interpreted as evidence of a sunk cost–sensitive decision
mechanism.
Why would the subject in this task occasionally accept bad offers
or stop waiting after accepting an offer? A perfect decision maker
would not abort a guaranteed investment after commitment without
new information or changes of reward contingencies when waiting.
All species in these time investment tasks, however, showed a large
variability in both their initial choices and abort behaviors. They
sometimes accepted or rejected offers with the same offer time and
aborted time investments, even for low offer times, that is, offers
with high value [figure S1 in (8)]. In addition, the subjects sometimes abandoned an offer they had previously accepted, although
no new information about the offer was provided during the time
investment, implying that there was variability in the valuation
process, even within one trial. This suggests that the subjects’ investment behavior was based on a valuation mechanism, with the
internal variability producing the observed choices (13–17).
A simple toy model with elements borrowed from signal detection and drift diffusion frameworks (18–21) can account for the

variability in choice behavior and produce the reported behavioral
signatures that are claimed to require sunk cost sensitivity. To
account for subjects’ variable choice behavior both in their initial
choice (whether to accept an offer, Fig. 2A) and in their investment
behavior (whether to persist waiting until reward delivery, Fig. 2D),
we introduce an internal decision variable, willingness-to-wait (Wt),
which varies over time both across and within trials. As an internal
decision variable, Wt is the result of a valuation process assessing
the utility of waiting and, therefore, is measured in seconds. The
decision variable Wt is initialized at offer presentation (t = 0) as the
subjective value of waiting for a reward at this restaurant (rats
and mice) or video category (humans). Thus, the initial willingness-
to-wait W0 is given by the subject’s threshold, h (the offer at which
a subject accepts the offer on half of the trials), and choice noise,
Nchoice (zero mean Gaussian distribution), that is, W0 = h + Nchoice
(Fig. 2, A to C). The investment decision is accepted if W0 is above
the offer amount O (the time in seconds that the subject has to wait
to receive a reward), W0 > O, and rejected otherwise. During the
time investment period (t > 0), Wt fluctuates following a diffusion
process with noise Ndrift according to Wt+1 = Wt + Ndrift. After
Downloaded from https://www.science.org at Washington University on March 15, 2022

Fig. 2. A generative model without sunk cost mechanism accounts for choice behavior and reproduces apparent sunk cost sensitivity. (A) Model structure for the
initial decision to accept or reject an offer. The model’s agent compares an offer value with an internal, hidden variable, the initial willingness-to-wait (W0) [equations (i)
and (ii)]. (B) The initial willingness-to-wait (W0) (orange) varies across trials. W0 is sampled from a Gaussian distribution, P(W0), around the threshold h. (C) Decision rule:
The offer is accepted if the trial’s W0 is higher than the trial’s offer. (D) Model structure for aborting a time investment. Wt is corrupted by noise [equation (iii)]. The agent
leaves the wait zone and stops investing if Wt < Offer − t [equation (iv)]. (E) Wt drifts during the waiting (investment) period. Each line corresponds to one example trial
with the same initial W0 and the same offer value. (F) Probability of earning a reward, P(Earn), as a function of the remaining countdown, and conditioned on how long
the decision agent already waited (sunk costs, colored lines). (G) The absolute value of the slope of the lines in (F) decreases as the time already waited increases
[colors as in (F)]. See Materials and Methods for more details.
Ott et al., Sci. Adv. 8, eabi7004 (2022)
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is observed in the data, albeit somewhat more pronounced [figure
S10C in (8)]. Note that simple additions to the model motivated by
psychophysics, such as scalar timing (22), would lead to the amplification of apparent sunk cost effects for high remaining offer times.
How does a statistical dependency between the variability in the
willingness-to-wait and sunk costs arise? A behavioral analysis conditioned on how much time a subject has already waited (sunk costs, S)
is subject to a statistical fallacy, a form of attrition bias (11, 12). Aborted
trials tend to be those that had low initial willingness-to-wait values
W0 because smaller random fluctuations can push them toward the
abort threshold. In other words, the initial willingness-to-wait values
W0 for all accepted trials (i.e., at t = 0 s) will be lower than for trials in
which the subject had already waited for a longer amount of time (e.g.,
at t = 20 s) (Fig. 3B). Even for the same remaining countdown time
O − t, conditioning on longer past investments, that is, higher sunk costs
S, will select trials with a larger initial offer O and, therefore, higher
initial willingness-to-wait values W0 for the accepted offers (in which
the noise Nchoice has pushed W0 > O). Consequently, conditioning on
higher sunk cost S will select more positive instances of the noise
Nchoice, i.e., E[Nchoice | s2] > E[Nchoice | s1] for s2 > s1 and with Nchoice | s
representing the distribution of Nchoice after conditioning on s (E[X] is
the expected value of a random variable X). Similarly, fluctuations in
Wt during waiting caused by Ndrift produce a statistical dependency
between S and the subselected distributions of Ndrift after conditioning
on S: Trials in which the cumulative drift diffusion noise Ndrift is negative will lead to a low willingness-to-wait Wt and therefore tend to be
aborted, since the willingness-to-wait Wt can drop below the abort
threshold. Thus, for trials that have not been aborted, the mean of
noise, Ndrift, for a given sunk cost S (i.e., E[Ndrift | S]) is positively correlated with sunk cost S (Fig. 3C). In both cases, conditioning the
probability of earning a reward P(Earn) on sunk cost S will select trials
with higher internal willingness-to-wait Wt. This selection bias therefore cannot isolate the contribution of sunk costs to earning a reward.
Apparent sunk cost sensitivity arises from a confounding
task variable: Time elapsed in a trial
In this section, we provide a formal analysis of the conditions under
which apparent sunk sensitivity arises. This section generalizes the
claims based on the model introduced in the previous section and
can be skipped by the reader without affecting the flow of the text.

Fig. 3. Behavioral model predictions. (A) Choice behavior as a function of the offer value in model implementation; see figure 1 in (10) and figure 3 in (9). The probability of accepting an offer decreased with increasing offer value. The data points represent 300 trials randomly sampled from the model simulation. (B) The distribution of
initial willingness-to-wait W0 at the time of the offer is shifted to the right for trials in which the model subject had waited a long time (t = 20 s, i.e., sunk costs ≥ 20 s, yellow)
compared with all accepted offer trials, i.e., trials including all waiting times (t = 0 s, i.e., sunk costs > 0 s, blue). This implies that conditioning on increasing waiting times
(i.e., sunk costs) will select trials for which the drift process started on average at higher initial W0 values. (C) The mean variability Ndrift increases with the time invested,
i.e., sunk costs, S. Model parameters as in Fig. 2. The observed effects were robust for a large range of tested parameters.
Ott et al., Sci. Adv. 8, eabi7004 (2022)
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committing to an offer, the decision to abort an ongoing time investment is taken if the willingness-to-wait Wt drops below the remaining time required to wait before reward delivery. The more
time has passed, the sooner the reward will arrive; hence, the abort
threshold is given by the time since accepting, t, subtracted from the
initial offer amount O, i.e., O − t (Fig. 2, D and E).
Using this model, we analyzed the proposed behavioral signatures
of a sensitivity to sunk costs, the conditional probability of earning a
reward P(Earn) as a function of time left before reward delivery O − t
[Fig. 2, F and G, and see figure 2 in (8)]. This conditional probability
was computed for the different time durations already spent waiting
for the reward, that is, sunk costs S (Fig. 2F). We observed that the
slope of the curve decreased as more time had been invested (Fig. 2G).
Thus, the variability in willingness-to-wait, which is necessary to explain the variability in choice and abort behaviors, is sufficient to
produce the proposed signatures of the sunk cost sensitivity without
any sunk cost–sensitive decision mechanisms.
Our model, although simple, makes a few predictions. First, by
construction, variability in the decision to accept or reject an offer is
greatest around the subjective threshold and predicts abort decisions. The initial choices reflect a graded valuation of offer times.
Short-time investment offers have high subjective values (only a
small investment cost required to obtain a reward), and long-time
investment offers have low subjective values (high investment cost
required to obtain a reward). Thus, short offers (high value) are
mostly accepted, and long offers (low value) are mostly rejected and
there is graded variability of “accept” decisions for intermediate offers around the decision threshold (Fig. 3A). Long-time investment
offers that are accepted above the decision threshold (“incorrect decisions”) are more likely to be eventually aborted. This choice behavior is observed in all species across several studies [see figure S1
(A to C) in (8), figure 1 (B to E) in (10), and figure 3 in (9)]. Second,
after accepting an offer, most decisions to abort an investment should
happen early and before the remaining countdown time falls below
the abort threshold, O − t, since the threshold moves away from the
decision variable Wt as time passes. This pattern of quitting behavior
is observed in all species [see figures S4 and S12 in (8)]. Last, an
interesting feature of our model is that the magnitude of the apparent
sunk cost effect, that is, the difference in the slopes in Fig. 2F, increases
with the elapsed time in a trial (Fig. 2, F and G). Again, this feature
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P(Earn∣S, O  * ) ≠ P(Earn∣O  *)	

(1)

Specifically, the authors show that the probability of waiting until reward delivery increases with increasing sunk costs; that is, even
for the same O* = o*, they find, for s2 > s1
	P O*(Earn∣S = s 2 ) > P O* (Earn∣S = s 1)	

(2)

This finding [figure 2 in (8)] is presented as a signature of sunk
cost–sensitive behavior. Interpreted causally, the decision to continue or abort the time investment would be influenced by both the
remaining countdown O* and sunk costs S (Fig. 4A).
The interpretation that these behavioral patterns reflect sunk
cost sensitivity does not account for the puzzle that accepted decisions are sometimes aborted. There is no new information provided
to subjects that would prompt them to reevaluate their decisions.
There are also no experimental interventions that would drive reevaluation of the accepted decisions. Yet, all subjects show spontaneous aborts and the entire experiment relies on these reevaluations.
We can account for both abort decisions and the original choice
variability of the accept/reject decisions by assuming a noisy internal valuation process. We introduce an internal—or hidden—state
of the subject: the subjective value V of the offer at time t. Because
in this task value V refers to the value of a time investment offer, V
Ott et al., Sci. Adv. 8, eabi7004 (2022)
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Fig. 4. Economic decision to invest time can be driven by external variables and
internal states. (A) Causal graphical model [a model describing a possible causal
relationship between variables; (38)] describing that the threshold-normalized offer at
time t (time from investing) O* determines the investment behavior and, thus, if a
reward was earned in a given trial E in the restaurant row and web surf tasks. Note
that, for simplicity, we only show the most relevant model variables. The authors’
major conclusion (8) states that the irrecoverable time invested, sunk costs S, also
influences investment decisions (dashed line). (B) Similar model as in (A) complemented with an additional internal state, V, describing the subjective valuation
process that produces a variability in choice behavior. Observed investment behavior across humans, mice, and rats can be explained by variability in V alone but
without a causal influence of sunk costs S.

can be measured in seconds. V can be interpreted as the subjective
representation of the value of offer O* and, thus, expressed as
V = −O* + N, where N captures the variability or noise in the subjective valuation process (in our previous toy model, V corresponds
to the willingness-to-wait W with V = W − O). Note that high value
offers of V correspond to short-time investment offers O. In this
hidden state decision model, an offer is accepted if V > 0 (decision
rule) and P(Earn) is not determined by O* but by its internal representation V [here, P(Earn) increases with increasing value V] without
the additional influence of S (Fig. 4B)
	
P(Earn∣S, V ) = P(Earn∣V ) = P(Earn∣− O  *  + N)	

(3)

Equation 3 implies that, for a fixed O* = o*, the probability of
earning a reward is given by PO*(Earn | N) and, thus, will statistically depend on N, with a higher N leading to higher P(Earn). If S and
N are not independent, that is, P(N | S) ≠ P(N), a statistical relationship between P O*(Earn) and S cannot disentangle a causal influence
of either N or S. Any model in which there is a positive correlation
between N and S, that is, N ∝ S, thus V ∝ S, could produce qualitatively similar behavioral patterns as reported by Sweis et al. (8).
How could a positive correlation between the variability N and
sunk costs S arise? The key feature of this task is that the sunk costs
correspond to the time spent waiting for a reward, that is, s = t. Let
us compare two distinct amounts of sunk costs, s1 = t1 and s2 = t2,
with t = t2 − t1 > 0. Now, consider an arbitrary but fixed (threshold-
normalized) remaining countdown time o*. Because, by definition,
o* = o − h − t, the following conditions hold for initial offers at t1 and t2
	o 1  − t 1  = o 2  − t 2	
	∆ t = o 2  − o 1	

(4)

Thus, considering higher sunk costs s 2 > s 1 and fixing the
remaining countdown time o* will select trials with higher initial
offers, o2 > o1. However, the valuation process V critically depends
on the initial offer O because, by definition, an offer is accepted only
when V > 0 at t = 0 (decision rule) for which V(t = 0) = −o*(t = 0) +
N(t = 0) = −o + h + N(t = 0). Crucially, although we fixed o*, the
average initial value of V is different when conditioning on s1 or s2.
Hence, the following holds
5 of 10
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We use a more generalized notation of the task’s decision variables
to avoid confusion with the specific computational model in the
previous section. We show that any fluctuation in the subject’s valuation process in determining investment decisions that either correlates with offer value or fluctuates across time is sufficient to
produce apparent sunk cost–sensitive behavior.
What are the factors that determine whether a subject decides to
continue to invest time in an offer or abort and move on to the test
option? In the study by Sweis et al. (8), the analysis of the investment behavior relates to the probability of earning a reward to the
time invested waiting for the reward (i.e., sunk costs) and to the
time remaining to reward delivery. In each trial, a subject is presented
a time investment offer O (we use uppercase letters for random
variables and lowercase letters for values assumed by random variables). We define a subjective threshold h (assumed to be fixed) as
the offer below which the subjects typically accept the offer. In the
original study, each restaurant used a uniquely flavored food pellet
as a reward (rodents) or a short video clip from a specific video
category (humans), thus producing a different, but fixed, subjective
threshold h for each restaurant or video category. Note that for simplicity and without a loss of generality, we consider a single restaurant or video category. The subjects accept an offer and start
investing time if o < h, that is, if o − h < 0 (decision rule, the time
investment offer in those trial is lower than the threshold). We define O* = O − h as the threshold-normalized offer at time t = 0 to
normalize the offer time across different “restaurants” (rodents) or
video categories (humans). When waiting, the threshold-normalized
remaining countdown time is given by O* = [O − t] − h. We define
sunk costs S as the time spent investing in an offer (until reward
delivery or an abort decision), that is, s = t. The major finding of
Sweis et al. (8) is that the probability of earning a reward P(Earn)
depends not only on the remaining countdown time O* [here,
P(Earn) increases with decreasing countdown time O*] but also on
irrecoverable sunk costs S (Fig. 4A)

SCIENCE ADVANCES | RESEARCH ARTICLE
V1 = −o1 + h + N1 > 0 ⇔ N1 > o1 − h and with Eq. 4
V2    = − o 2  + h + N2    = − o 1  − ∆t + h + N2   > 0 ⇔ N2    > o 1  − h + ∆t
and because ∆t > 0, it follows
	
E [ N∣s 2  ] = E [ N 2 ] > E [ N 1  ] = E [ N∣s 1]	

(5)

Equation 5 shows that the mean noise increases for higher investment durations s2 > s1, that is, higher sunk costs S. Therefore, we
observe a spurious correlation N ∝ S, so the following emerges
	P O*(Earn∣S = s 1 ) > P O*(Earn∣S = s 2)	

(6)

Interrupting the valuation process could dissociate sunk
cost and valuation
What behavioral observations can reveal sunk cost sensitivity? Susceptibility to sunk costs is usually tested in humans by confronting
subjects with two options: one “bad” choice (i.e., lower overall returns) toward a goal the subject has already invested in or an alternative “good” choice (i.e., higher overall returns) for which no prior
investment has been made (5, 6, 23). Similarly, human or animal
subjects could be confronted with two new choice alternatives after
having already invested in one of them: In the restaurant task, we
could make a novel time investment offer after subjects have already waited for a variable amount of time.
Ott et al., Sci. Adv. 8, eabi7004 (2022)
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DISCUSSION

Here, we showed that a recent report arguing that humans, mice,
and rats succumb to the sunk cost fallacy (8) is based on a value-
guided decision-making task that does not allow for a dissociation
between sunk costs and variability in the valuation process. An apparent sunk cost sensitivity can arise through a confounding variable in the task: the time elapsed in a trial, which reflects the sunk
6 of 10
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This reproduces the key behavioral observation (Eq. 2) reported
by Sweis et al. (8) [see toy model in Fig. 2, and see figure 2 in (8)].
Crucially, the statistical relation (Eq. 6) holds as a consequence of
the decision rule and variability in subjective valuation alone, here
without a causal influence of sunk costs S on earning a reward Earn.
Moreover, any other process for which Eq. 5 holds will result in
the statistical relation of Eq. 6, that is, an apparent influence of S on
P(Earn). For example, if leaving decisions while waiting for a reward are based on the momentary subjective value V at time t (e.g.,
leave if momentary V < 0), any noise in V will result in E[N2] > E[N1]
because consideration in Eqs. 4 and 5 holds not only for t = 0 but
also for any t. In other words, any temporal variability in V (i.e., N)
will result in the same statistical relation, that is, an apparent sunk
cost sensitivity (see toy model in Figs. 2 and 3). In addition, any positive correlation between variability N and offer value O, for example, if the variability in the valuation scales with the offer size, will
also produce similar patterns, because S ∝ O (see Eq. 4).
This analysis reveals a critical limitation in the task design for
determining the sunk cost sensitivity: The valuation process and
sunk costs are tightly linked through a confounding variable: time
elapsed in a trial. Conditioning the probability of earning a reward
on higher sunk costs S, that is, the time elapsed in a trial, will select
instances with higher positive fluctuations N and, thus, a higher valuation V. Thus, the variability in the valuation process hinders isolating any potential influence of sunk costs S on earning a reward
P(Earn) by introducing a selection bias for, on average, higher values of N when conditioning on an increasing S. Consequently, the
behavioral signature proposed by Sweis et al. (8) [Fig. 2, F and G,
figure 2 in (8)] does not distinguish whether the observed changes
in the probability of earning a reward are due to sunk costs or the
variability in the valuation process and, hence, do not provide definite
evidence for sunk cost sensitivity.

Why is it important to introduce a new offer? To isolate a sunk
cost S, measured as the elapsed time, we need to find a way to separate it from the offer value, V, that is also correlated with elapsed
time. Only an experimental manipulation can disentangle the latent
correlations that naturally occur between time and value. The experimental manipulation would need to remove the arrow connecting the initial offer O* and value V in the causal model diagram
(Fig. 5A). If such an experimental procedure is possible, we could
then evaluate the conditional probabilities of earning a reward
P(Earn | S) without a potential confound from sunk costs S to value
V or noise N.
We suggest an extension to the restaurant or web surf tasks that
would allow for such an experiment. If, at any moment while waiting for a reward, we “revise” the valuation process, the arrow from
initial offer O* to value V would be removed (Fig. 5A). Such a revise
mechanism, R, could be realized by randomly changing the offer
value while waiting from O* to R while making sure that O* and R
are not correlated (i.e., randomly choosing the timing and value of
R). The current value of the offer, V, would then only be determined
by the revise offer R, not by the initial offer O* (Fig. 5B). Behavioral
signatures for sunk costs in this revise offer task are similar to the
signatures previously proposed, that is, quantifying the conditional
probability of earning a reward P(Earn | S), with one crucial difference. For this experiment, we do not fix the initial offer O*, hence
allowing for spurious correlations between sunk costs S and noise
N, but we fix the momentary (threshold-normalized) remaining
countdown time given by R* = [R − t] − h (which is defined after
introducing the r offer R, i.e., t > trevise), which by its very construction is statistically not related to O*. Here, comparing the different sunk costs S amounts to comparing trials with different
time points of revise offer presentations trevise. Note that this experiment relies on the assumptions that value V is determined by the
revise offer R alone and that there is no “memory” of the previous
offer O* determining the investment decisions (and thereby preserving some degree of spurious correlation between S and R). A
possible simplification of this task could be to remove the initial
offer entirely and introduce the revise offer R after random waiting
time periods in the wait zone.
We added the random revise offer R to our toy model and analyzed the proposed behavioral signatures produced by the model.
As expected, the apparent influence of sunk cost on investment decisions was removed from the conditional probabilities
of earning a reward P(Earn | S) for a rational agent when using
the revise offer R to determine the remaining countdown time
(Fig. 5C). Next, we created a “sunk cost” agent by adding an explicit
sunk cost mechanism into our model that increases the momentary
willingness-to-wait Wt with a fixed amount per time step during
time investment. Analysis of the proposed behavioral signatures
using random revise offers now reveals a sunk costs effect, as expected (Fig. 5D).
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cost but also statistically informs the internal valuation process guiding investment decisions. Thus, although the restaurant row task
provides an elegant ethological design to study valuation and economic choice (9, 10), it does not offer an independent measure of
sunk cost sensitivity as usually understood in behavioral economics.
Normative decision models reproduce apparent sunk
cost–sensitive behavior
We presented a model that reproduces key features of the published
behavioral data, but without further analyses, we do not claim that
our model accounts for all aspects of the time investment behavior
reported in (8). Nevertheless, the model clarifies how the behavioral
patterns claimed to require a sunk cost mechanism can emerge by
necessity from a generic decision process; hence, these signatures
cannot be used as direct evidence to establish that a sunk cost mechanism is at work. Numerous additional factors that we did not consider
could also lead or contribute to the changes in the relationship between
the time invested, time remaining before the reward, and probability
of obtaining a reward. Variability in motivation (10, 24, 25), perception (26, 27), satiety (28), or any other fluctuation in subjective valuation correlates with investment durations or investment offers, including
random drift across trials.
Does the study by Sweis et al. (8) provide additional evidence for
sunk cost sensitivity? An elegant feature of the restaurant row task
is that there are two distinct decisions: first, whether to commit to
an offer and wait (offer zone) and, second, whether to stay or quit
waiting (wait zone). Only the second decision—to wait or to quit—
shows apparent sunk cost sensitivity, which has been used as an argument for the specificity of this effect (8). However, it is unclear how
the concept of sunk cost sensitivity could be applied to the decision
Ott et al., Sci. Adv. 8, eabi7004 (2022)
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to commit to an offer without first understanding how and why time
is spent during the deliberation period. Because there is no additional information gained nor is there an improvement in decision
quality while staying in the offer zone, it is unclear what factors determine the deliberation time (29). In contrast, the waiting times
after committing to an offer in the wait zone are directly related to
earning a reward, and a tone signals reward proximity, continually
furnishing additional information. The offer zone deliberation times
(i.e., reaction time) likely reflect multiple processes, including choice
difficulty, attention, and motivation (30–33). It is unclear why subjects spend substantial fraction of their total time budget deliberating even when it does not lead to better decisions. Thus, these two
decisions differ in several dimensions and are likely mediated by
distinct computational and neural mechanisms, a proposal supported by Sweis et al. (8).
For these reasons, we did not attempt to model the complex reaction time patterns observed in the restaurant row task (29). Our
account is compatible with a wide range of potential reaction time
models. Any model in which wait zone deliberation times (i.e., reaction
times) are not, on average, systematically related with the probability of earning a reward is compatible with the observed behavioral
findings and our decision model. More generally, models of deliberation time do not constrain time investment models, nor do they
provide evidence for sunk cost sensitivity of decisions.
In a variation of the “web surf” task (34), human subjects were
asked to attend to another task (detect a light change) during the
time investment period. In this scenario, the apparent behavioral
signatures of sunk cost sensitivity disappeared. The subjects rarely
aborted waiting in this case [see figure 3B in (34); subjects quit on
less than 4% of trials for the low value accepted offers], indicating a
7 of 10
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Fig. 5. An experimental design dissociating sunk costs and noisy valuation. (A) Causal graphical model of the proposed behavioral manipulation. An additional revise
offer (R) that is introduced randomly while waiting for the reward could remove an influence from O* to V (blocked arrow), thus allowing for a way to determine an influence from S on E (dashed arrow). (B) Modified restaurant task with revise offer. When waiting, a random revise offer (R) “revises” the initial offer O*. (C) Results of the toy
model simulation of this task; the same model as in Figs. 2 and 3 with an additional revise offer R. The probability of earning a reward P(Earn) against remaining countdown time, i.e., the value of revise offer R for different time investment values before the revise offer, was shown (sunk costs, colors). As before, there was no direct influence of the sunk costs S on leaving decisions in the model. (D) Results of the toy model with an additional direct influence of sunk costs S on leaving decisions.
Specifically, the willingness-to-wait Wt was increased by 1 in each second. See Materials and Methods for details.
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change in the goal of the decision maker, for example, a reevaluation of the relative costs and benefits of waiting. In the attention-
demanding task, the decision maker might not be driven by a
valuation process of the cost of waiting alone, but rather the goals
defined by attention-demanding task (detecting a light change). Regardless of the specific interpretation, our arguments equally apply
to apparent sunk cost–sensitive behavior in this study (34).

Improved behavioral task design to study sunk cost sensitivity
Behavioral tasks for testing the potential effects of sunk costs need
to ensure that sunk costs are not correlated with offer value or other
task variables contributing to choice behavior. Uncovering the causal
models underlying decisions requires behavioral manipulations or
quasi-experiments to disentangle this correlation (37, 38). There are
numerous behavioral designs we did not explore; for example,
prompting animals at random times with offers to give up waiting for
smaller rewards could probe the momentary value function underlying their abort decisions, revealing whether behavior is directly driven
by sunk costs or purely by correlations between the offer value and
investment size. In the economic literature, signatures of sunk costs
are often the most salient when external conditions change or are
ambiguous (39). These paradigms probe the idea that deviations from
optimality emerge because of sunk costs, as a consequence not only
of random variability but also of the inability to appropriately evaluate new information to maximize returns.
Cognitive biases and statistical fallacies
Our approach could be applied to other economic decision-making
scenarios. For example, in a commonly cited example of sunk costs
in behavioral economics, there is the draft pick order of NBA players influenced playing time and trading strategy (40). Players highest in the draft pick played more often and were traded later than
players with equivalent game statistics but who were lower in the
draft order, suggesting that team managers placed weight on previous, irrecoverable investments in addition to current performance.
A careful analysis revealed that this sunk cost effect was greatly reduced, although still present, when accounting for latent variables,
such as on-court performance or injuries. In a recent study, model-
based analysis demonstrated that in situations with stochastic
outcomes (e.g., gambling) apparent sunk cost sensitivity can emerge
Ott et al., Sci. Adv. 8, eabi7004 (2022)
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MATERIALS AND METHODS

Models were simulated and analyzed using custom MATLAB code
that can be found at https://github.com/KepecsLab/SunkCostModel.
Model for restaurant task (Figs. 2 and 3)
We implemented a simple toy model with elements borrowed from
signal detection and drift diffusion frameworks. By introducing a
variable internal state, the willingness-to-wait, our generic toy
8 of 10
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Alternative models for sunk cost sensitivity
How does our model relate to other proposals that explain their susceptibility to sunk costs? State-dependent valuation learning or
within-trial contrast models assume that the value of an expected
return is estimated relative to the current energetic or affective state
(35, 36). In these models, sunk cost sensitivity arises because the value
is a decelerated function of the current energetic state, increasing the
value of the same expected return the more resources are depleted.
Sunk cost sensitivity in these cases also arises from an internal valuation process, similar to our model. However, both of these sunk cost
models require numerous additional assumptions about how value
changes with invested time and energetic state. In contrast, our model
produces apparent sunk cost sensitivity through random fluctuations
in the valuation process alone, accounting for the key features of the
choice behavior. Therefore, our model is not an alternative to other
explanations for sunk cost sensitivity; rather, it highlights how sunk
cost–like behavior can arise simply because of stochasticity within a
rational decision-making framework.

from a selection bias, because longer investments made extreme outcomes more likely (41).
These and other examples highlight how latent variables that were
unaccounted for can introduce or accentuate sunk cost–like behavioral
patterns (39, 42, 43). In another recent study, sunk cost sensitivity
was reported in two primate species trained to track a moving target with
a joystick for a variable time duration (44). Monkeys could stop and
abort the trial at any time. In an analysis similar to Sweis et al. (8),
monkeys were more likely to complete a trial and earn a reward when
they had already persisted with the task for a longer period [figure
4 in (44)]. Again, an interpretation of this behavioral pattern will
benefit from a model that considers why monkeys aborted trials at
different times even for the same trial types—making this analysis
susceptible to similar statistical artifacts.
Identifying decision mechanisms from behavioral observations
alone is challenging because the experimenter must infer latent cognitive variables. In cognitive neuroscience and neuroeconomics,
carefully designed tasks that rely on nonverbal behavioral reports
have allowed researchers to relate internal variables to behavioral
and neural signals, such as subjective value, motivation, attention,
risk preference, or confidence (17, 27, 45–55). In the case of confidence, a well-known cognitive bias occurs in poor performers who
are overconfident in their abilities, known as the Dunning-Kruger
effect (56). This interpretation has been challenged by noting that
regression to the mean would lead to similar observations of overconfidence (57–59) and a rational Bayesian inference model largely
explains the miscalibration of confidence (60).
Our analysis also highlights the need for quantitative and causal
graphical models when analyzing economic and cognitive processes
(38, 61). The literature of causal statistical inference provides numerous examples for how disregarding confounder or collider variables can lead to misinterpretations (37). A similar statistical fallacy
is well known in clinical trials as the attrition bias, the differential
dropout of study participants between treatment groups, which can
lead to a misinterpretation of treatment success (11, 12). Alternatively, we can understand the present statistical fallacy as akin to the
well-known Simpson’s and Lord’s paradoxes when elapsed time
(i.e., sunk costs) is considered as a random variable. Here, the confounding variable is time, which both determines the sunk costs and
influences the “base rates” of the variability in the valuation process
when considering different sunk costs (62, 63).
In summary, we emphasize the importance of explicit models to
guide the interpretation of complex behavioral processes. Counterintuitive and deceiving behavioral patterns can arise due to statistical confounds and artifact. Such statistical fallacies have been long
appreciated in other fields such as econometrics and are likely to be
common when investigating the behavioral signatures of cognitive
processes driven by latent variables, including attention, confidence,
and investment decisions (20, 64, 65).
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Models for restaurant task with revise offer (Fig. 5)
For the restaurant task with revise offer, the toy model followed the
same overall decision rules as for the restaurant task (see above). In
the restaurant task with revise offer, the original offer can change at
random time points while waiting (Fig. 5). Accordingly, the model
agent’s willingness-to-wait is reset when the revised offer is presented
with a new willingness-to-wait Wt=r = h + Nchoice using the same definitions as above and with r defined as the time of the revised offer
presentation. Revised offer times and revised offer amounts were randomly drawn between 0 and 30 s (uniformly distributed). All simulation parameters were the same as above (Figs. 2 and 3).
For the sunk cost–sensitive agent (Fig. 5D), the willingness-towait Wt was increased by 1 s for each second, reflecting a direct influence of sunk cost to the agent’s decision. Other model parameters
Ott et al., Sci. Adv. 8, eabi7004 (2022)
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were the same as above, except for a higher drift = 5 s, which produces leaving decisions for the generally higher Wt values because
of the direct sunk cost influence.
View/request a protocol for this paper from Bio-protocol.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Macmillan, 2011).
2. A. Tversky, D. Kahneman, The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science
211, 453–458 (1981).
3. T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, D. Kahnemann, Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive
Judgment (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002).
4. L. R. Santos, A. G. Rosati, The evolutionary roots of human decision making. Annu. Rev.
Psychol. 66, 321–347 (2015).
5. H. R. Arkes, C. Blumer, The psychology of sunk cost. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 35,
124–140 (1985).
6. H. R. Arkes, P. Ayton, The sunk cost and concorde effects: Are humans less rational than
lower animals? Psychol. Bull. 125, 591–600 (1999).
7. P. Magalhães, K. Geoffrey White, The sunk cost effect across species: A review
of persistence in a course of action due to prior investment. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 105,
339–361 (2016).
8. B. M. Sweis, S. V. Abram, B. J. Schmidt, K. D. Seeland, A. W. MacDonald, M. J. Thomas,
A. D. Redish, Sensitivity to “sunk costs” in mice, rats, and humans. Science 361, 178–181
(2018).
9. S. V. Abram, Y. A. Breton, B. Schmidt, A. D. Redish, A. W. MacDonald, The Web-Surf Task:
A translational model of human decision-making. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 16, 37–50
(2016).
10. A. P. Steiner, A. D. Redish, Behavioral and neurophysiological correlates of regret in rat
decision-making on a neuroeconomic task. Nat. Neurosci. 17, 995–1002 (2014).
11. M. L. Bell, M. G. Kenward, D. L. Fairclough, N. J. Horton, Differential dropout and bias
in randomised controlled trials: When it matters and when it may not. BMJ 346, e8668
(2013).
12. D. Nunan, J. Aronson, C. Bankhead, Catalogue of bias: Attrition bias. BMJ Evid. Based Med.
23, 21–22 (2018).
13. J. D. Cohen, S. M. McClure, A. J. Yu, Should I stay or should I go? How the human brain
manages the trade-off between exploitation and exploration. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B
Biol. Sci. 362, 933–942 (2007).
14. N. D. Daw, K. Doya, The computational neurobiology of learning and reward. Curr. Opin.
Neurobiol. 16, 199–204 (2006).
15. N. D. Daw, J. P. O’Doherty, P. Dayan, B. Seymour, R. J. Dolan, Cortical substrates
for exploratory decisions in humans. Nature 441, 876–879 (2006).
16. A. Lak, E. Hueske, J. Hirokawa, P. Masset, T. Ott, A. E. Urai, T. H. Donner, M. Carandini,
S. Tonegawa, N. Uchida, A. Kepecs, Reinforcement biases subsequent perceptual decisions
when confidence is low, a widespread behavioral phenomenon. eLife 9, e49834 (2020).
17. P. Masset, T. Ott, A. Lak, J. Hirokawa, A. Kepecs, Behavior- and modality-general
representation of confidence in orbitofrontal cortex. Cell 182, 112–126.e18 (2020).
18. R. Bogacz, E. Brown, J. Moehlis, P. Holmes, J. D. Cohen, The physics of optimal decision
making: A formal analysis of models of performance in two-alternative forced-choice
tasks. Psychol. Rev. 113, 700–765 (2006).
19. J. I. Gold, M. N. Shadlen, The neural basis of decision making. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 30,
535–574 (2007).
20. J. I. Sanders, B. Hangya, A. Kepecs, Signatures of a statistical computation in the human
sense of confidence. Neuron 90, 499–506 (2016).
21. B. Hangya, J. I. Sanders, A. Kepecs, A mathematical framework for statistical decision
confidence. Neural Comput. 28, 1840–1858 (2016).
22. J. Gibbon, Scalar expectancy theory and Weber’s law in animal timing. Psychol. Rev. 84,
279–325 (1977).
23. A. I. Teger, Too Much Invested to Quit (Pergamon Press, 1980).
24. K. C. Berridge, From prediction error to incentive salience: Mesolimbic computation
of reward motivation. Eur. J. Neurosci. 35, 1124–1143 (2012).
25. B. Blain, G. Hollard, M. Pessiglione, Neural mechanisms underlying the impact of daylong
cognitive work on economic decisions. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 113, 6967–6972 (2016).
26. N. E. Raine, L. Chittka, The adaptive significance of sensory bias in a foraging context:
Floral colour preferences in the bumblebee Bombus terrestris. PLOS ONE 2, e556 (2007).
27. A. Lak, G. M. Costa, E. Romberg, A. A. Koulakov, Z. F. Mainen, A. Kepecs, Orbitofrontal cortex
is required for optimal waiting based on decision confidence. Neuron 84, 190–201 (2014).
28. K. Doya, Modulators of decision making. Nat. Neurosci. 11, 410–416 (2008).
29. B. M. Sweis, A. D. Redish, M. J. Thomas, Prolonged abstinence from cocaine or morphine
disrupts separable valuations during decision conflict. Nat. Commun. 9, 2521 (2018).

9 of 10

Downloaded from https://www.science.org at Washington University on March 15, 2022

model not only explained the variable choice behavior observed in
the restaurant and web surf tasks but also produced apparent sensitivity to sunk cost because of statistical bias, i.e., attrition bias.
When the model agent is presented with a time investment offer,
the agent compares the offer value with an internal, hidden variable,
the initial willingness-to-wait (W0). The willingness-to-wait W0 is a
noisy version of the agent’s threshold h for the current “restaurant,”
given by W0 = h + Nchoice, where Nchoice is a zero-mean Gaussian-
distributed random variable with standard deviation noise. The agent
accepts an offer (and enters the wait zone) if W0 > Offer or skips
an offer if W0 < Offer to proceed to the next restaurant. Thus, the
initial willingness-to-wait (W0) varies across trials. After accepting an
offer and while waiting, Wt (t > 0) is corrupted by noise in each second with
Wt + 1 = Wt + Ndrift, where Ndrift is a zero-mean Gaussian-distributed random variable with standard deviation drift. The momentary willingnessto-wait at time t, Wt, is compared with the remaining countdown
Offer − t. The agent leaves the wait zone and stops investing if Wt <
Offer − t or receives a reward if the offer time has passed, thus ending a trial. Thus, on trials in which the subject accepted the offer, Wt
drifts during the waiting (investment) period, varying within a trial. The
drift process can either be interrupted if Wt drifts below the time remaining before reward delivery or if the offer time has passed and
reward is delivered. The decision threshold is decreasing with time
(i.e., the decision threshold is given by O − t) because the subjects
move closer to the reward, reflecting the fact that the momentary (remaining) offer is decreasing while waiting. Note that a nondecreasing
decision threshold produces similar effects.
In the model, there are two sources of variability, each contributing to apparent sunk cost sensitivity due to an attrition bias when
analyzing P(Earn) as a function of sunk cost: (i) variability in W0,
which explains the subjects’ variable choice behavior around the
subjective threshold h. Attrition of low W0 produces apparent sunk
cost sensitivity. Note that removing variability in W0 still produces
apparent sunk cost sensitivity due to the second source of variability.
(ii) Variability in Wt, i.e., while waiting, which explains the subjects’
leaving behavior. Attrition of low Wt produces apparent sunk cost
sensitivity (even when W0 is not variable). Note that variability in
Wt cannot be easily removed since subjects would never leave after
accepting an offer.
The simulation was performed with h = 18 s, choice = 5 s, drift = 3 s,
N = 1,000,000 trials. Offers were randomly selected between 0 and
30 s (uniformly distributed). Parameters were chosen to qualitatively
match the subjects’ choice behavior in the restaurant task and were
qualitatively stable across a large range of tested parameters.
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